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Background: It is likely that calls for disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs) continue in response to
international disasters. As part of a national survey, the present study was designed to evaluate the Australian
DMAT experience and the need for logistic support.
Methods: Data were collected via an anonymous mailed survey distributed via State and Territory
representatives on the Australian Health Protection Committee, who identified team members associated
with Australian DMAT deployments from the 2004 Asian Tsunami disaster.
Results: The response rate for this survey was 50% (59/118). Most of the personnel had deployed to the South
East Asian Tsunami affected areas. The DMAT members had significant clinical and international
experience. There was unanimous support for dedicated logistic support with 80% (47/59) strongly agreeing.
Only one respondent (2%) disagreedwith teams being self sufficient for a minimum of 72 hours. Most felt that
transport around the site was not a problem (59%; 35/59), however, 34% (20/59) felt that transport to the site
itself was problematic. Only 37% (22/59) felt that pre-deployment information was accurate. Communication
with local health providers and other agencies was felt to be adequate by 53% (31/59) and 47% (28/59)
respectively, while only 28% (17/59) felt that documentation methods were easy to use and reliable. Less than
half (47%; 28/59) felt that equipment could be moved easily between areas by team members and 37% (22/59)
that packaging enabled materials to be found easily. The maximum safe container weight was felt to be
between 20 and 40 kg by 58% (34/59).
Conclusions: This study emphasises the importance of dedicated logistic support for DMATand the need for
teams to be self sufficient for a minimum period of 72 hours. There is a need for accurate pre deployment
information to guide resource prioritisation with clearly labelled pre packaging to assist access on site.
Container weights should be restricted to between 20 and 40 kg, which would assist transport around the site,
while transport to the site was seen as problematic. There was also support for training of all team members
in use of basic equipment such as communications equipment, tents and shelters and water purification
systems.
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O
n 26 December 2004, the South East Asian
tsunami hit countries around the Indian Ocean
rim killing more than 250,000 people and affect-
ing millions (1). Following the tsunami, seven civilian
teams were deployed under AUSASSISTPLAN (2) with
these listed in Table 1. The teams came from multiple
states, deployed to a number of different countries and
filled a variety of roles based on needs and timeline of
response. This was the first time an organised civilian
based team was deployed internationally representing the
Australian government, with previous deployments the
responsibility of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
Australia has since deployed teams to Samoa, Pakistan
and New Zealand. Further deployments are likely given
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prepared of nations (3 5), while disasters are also more
likely to occur in developing countries (6,7), with external
assistance even more necessary.
Responding agencies must be prepared to provide
the equipment and supplies needed to carry on their
operations, often in austere environments or those with
disrupted infrastructure. This needs to include food,
water, accommodation, clothing, security, finances, com-
munications and possibly transportation (8).
Much of the literature concerning DMATs, including
the Australian DMAT experience (9 15) consists of
anecdotal team reports. The lack of standards for
DMATs has made in-depth evaluation difficult for
external reviewers with few studies examining DMAT
deployments and few dedicated studies of DMAT
members in Australia. The present survey was part of a
national program evaluating the Australian DMAT
experience and examining potential models for future
use in Australia. The survey was undertaken in order to
target the existing Australian DMATexperience base and
explore issues raised by these groups. The experience base
primarily includes those individuals actually deployed
and this aspect of the survey explores the issue of logistic
support for DMATs. Specifically, we sought to determine
the level of support for dedicated logistics in deployable
teams and whether specific elements of logistic support
caused more difficulties than others.
Methods
All team members associated with Australian DMAT
deployments from the 2004 South East Asian Tsunami
were surveyed via their State/territory jurisdictions. The
study protocol was reviewed and approved by the James
Cook University Human Research Ethics Committee in
2006 (Approval No. H2464). The support of the Com-
monwealth Australian Health Protection Committee
(AHPC) was also sought and given for the survey.
Representatives of the AHPC through their State and
Territory jurisdictions identified 118 DMAT personnel
from Teams Alpha to Golf and mailed out questionnaires
on our behalf to preserve anonymity. No follow-ups were
able to be undertaken.
Data were collected by means of a self-reporting
questionnaire, which included an information sheet.
The questionnaire was piloted and validated by use of
a sample of senior medical staff with disaster deploy-
ment experience. The questionnaire was completed
anonymously. A reply paid envelope was included for
convenience; howeverother options for return were given,
including facsimile. There were no penalties or rewards
for participation, and informed consent was implied if
team members completed and returned their question-
naires. The logistics component of the survey constituted
four A4 sized pages andwas comprised of simple tick-box
format, Likert scale responses and free text comment.
Data were also collected on demographic details of team
members.
Data were entered into a spreadsheet program and
analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (Version 14.0, SPSS, 2006). Descriptive statistics
were used, as the sample was relatively small.
A structured literature review was also performed in
support of the survey using the search terms ‘disaster
medical assistance team’, ‘disaster team’ and ‘disaster’ 
‘logistics’.
Results
The overall response rate for this survey was 50% (59/
118). The majority of DMAT members who responded
had deployed to Aceh (39 members), while seven had
deployed to the Maldives and one to Sri Lanka. Some
had deployed more than once including subsequently to
Yogyakarta (8 members). Team members responded from
all states which deployed personnel with highest response
numbers from Queensland (22 members), South Austra-
lia (14 members) and Western Australia (13 members).
It is noted that response rates from both New South
Wales (6 members) and Victoria (1 member) were lower
than other states while overall numbers involved for
Northern Territory were low (2 members). Responses
were received from those with medical (24 members),
Table 1. Australian DMATs deployed following the Asian tsunami
Team Number Main States Destination Date deployed
Alpha 14 NSW (17), WA (7), Qld (3), Vic (1) Banda Aceh 29 December 2004
Bravo 14 Banda Aceh 29 December 2004
Charlie 17 NSW/WA/Qld Maldives 30 December 2004
Delta 5 NSW Sri Lanka 30 December 2004
Echo 23 SA Banda Aceh 7 January 2005
Foxtrot 24 Qld Banda Aceh 18 January 2005
Golf 21 Vic/NT Banda Aceh 29 January 2005
Key: NSW-New South Wales, WA-Western Australia, Qld-Queensland, Vic-Victoria, SA-South Australia, NT-Northern Territory
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(3 members) and command (3 members) roles as well as
mixed roles consisting of medical/command (2 members),
medical/logistics (1 member), nursing command (1 mem-
ber) and nursing logistics (1 members).
Themajorityofteammembersrespondingtothesurvey
were aged 45 55 years (53%; 31/59) with 16 (27%) aged
25 35 years, eight (14%) aged 55 65, three (5%) aged 25 
35 and one person (2%) aged more than 65 years of age.
Thisis consistent withthe meanlevel of clinical experience
in their specialty of 21 years (SD 9). Most respondents
were male (75%; 44/59) with 23% female (14/59) with one
response missing. 57% of survey participants (34/59) had
significant experience in international disasters although
very few felt they had experience in disaster management
before deployment (5%; 3/59).
Survey responses are described in Table 2. There was
unanimous support for dedicated logistics with 80%
(47/59) strongly agreeing. Only one respondent (2%)
disagreed with teams being self sufficient for a minimum
of 72 hours with 75% (44/59) strongly agreeing. Most felt
that transport around the site was not a problem (59%;
35/59); however, 34% (20/59) felt that transport to the site
itself was problematic. Only 37% (22/59) felt that pre-
deployment information was accurate. Communication
with local health providers and other agencies was felt to
be adequate by 53% (31/59) and 47% (28/59) respectively,
while 20% (12/59) and 17% (10/59) disagreed with this.
Only 28% (17/59) felt that documentation methods were
easy to use and reliable. Less than half (47%; 28/59) felt
equipment could be moved easily between areas by
team members with even less agreement (37%; 22/59)
that packaging enabled materials to be found easily.
The maximum safe container weight was felt to be 20 to
40 kg by 58% (34/59) while 20% (12/59) felt this should be
less than 20kg and 12% (7/59) opted for 40 to 60 kg.
Survey participants were also asked to indicate if any
essential items were not available. Of the 22% (13/59) that
indicated yes, these were just as likely to be related to
logistic support (17%; 10/59) as clinical care (17%; 10/59)
or personal comfort (14%; 8/59).
Discussion
This study represented the first national survey of
Australian DMAT members. The experiences of these
deployed professionals in relation to logistic support for
deployment should help inform future planning and
preparedness. This is particularly relevant given the
ongoing development of an Australian disaster medical
assistance team (AUSMAT) program (16).
Critical to a successful health response are important
non-medical elements such as communication, sanitation,
safety and security, logistics, supply systems, administra-
tion and finance (17,18). Each organisation should
develop its own logistics capacity (19) with logistics
support a common element of many international models
(20,21). The need for dedicated logistics was strongly
supported by respondents in this study and reinforces
comments from descriptive accounts of Australian
deployments (14,15).
The logistics role may occupy a significant component
of the team depending on the level of self-sustainability
required. A typical US DMAT has 34 personnel with
7 non-medical team members (22), while the Canadian
DART includes a 20-member logistics team to maintain
self-sustainability in support of a 200 member team
(23,24). Most Australian DMAT have used embedded
external logistic support from agencies such as Fire and
Rescue (11,15), emphasising the multi agency nature of
response.
An effective andwell co-ordinated logistics operation is
crucial in a humanitarian context, with the need to
respond quickly and efficiently essential during disasters
(25). For this to occur, logistics needs to be incorporated
prior to the response phase, and should be seen as an
essential element of both pre and post deployment
activities. Definitions of logistics differ, often based on
organisation function. OCHA describes the basic task of
a logistics system as being ‘to deliver the appropriate
supplies, in good condition, in the quantities required,
and at the places and time they are needed’ (26). In the
immediate aftermath of any disaster, these supplies
include items that are vital for survival, such as food,
water, temporary shelter and medicine, among others, as
well as the relocation of disaster-affected people, transfer
of casualties, and the movement of relief workers (25,26).
Deployable teams must be self-sufficient (3,27 30).
This avoids placing additional demands on the affected
community for food, water and shelter (30,31) and is
particularly important in austere environments such as
post tsunami in Banda Aceh (11), or the Bam earthquake
(32). This should cover at least the initial 72 hours
(22,33), consistent with the results of this survey, but
should ideally be for the duration of the stay (30,31).
Food and water safety is important. Hazards include lack
of hand washing facilities, inadequate refrigeration, use
of unsafe ingredients and improper temperature controls.
Water supplies for both team members and patients need
to be included with an adequate amount of reasonably
safe water preferable to a lesser amount of pure water
(29). A minimum of 3 to 5 litres/person/day is needed for
survival, with 15 to 20 litres for fluid replacement,
personal hygiene, cooking and sanitation (34). Water
safety methods include boiling for at least a minute
(although fuel supplies may be limited) and chemical
disinfection of water using sodium hypochlorite solution,
iodine or halogen tablets (34,35). Logistic support should
consider the use of supply rations airlifted weekly (24), or
use of prepared meals such as military ration packs which
can be eaten hot or cold (36). Locally prepared food with
Logistical support provided to Australian DMATs
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supports the local economy (29). The minimum caloric
intake level is 2100 kcal/day (29).
Sanitary disposal of human waste is essential to
prevent contamination of water supplies and spread of
communicable disease by insect or rodent vectors, while
medical and biohazard waste must also be handled and
disposed of carefully (34). Biohazard bags should be used
with individuals responsible for disposal (37). The main-
tenance of personal hygiene is important for the health of
team members, with access to hand washing, shower and
laundry facilities, refuse disposal and chemical or pit
toilets essential (29,34). Waterless hand sanitisers may
need to be used (34).
Coordinated and organised equipment caches are
essential (38). In addition to water, food and sanitation,
base camp equipment should include shelter, generators,
lighting and team medical needs (30,31). General equip-
ment includes fuel cans, duct tape, spare bulbs, batteries
and fuses, toolkit, tarpaulins and tools. All equipment
must be tailored to the deployment environment with
each team member able to use all equipment (39,40).
Teams should bring their own medical equipment,
including patient shelter, based on the anticipated role
and patient numbers. This should use local data and must
be adaptable to local population needs (20). Both
clinicians and logisticians should be involved with the
detailed planning needed for supply of items such as
oxygen, clinical waste disposal, and blood and blood
products. Given space and weight considerations, drugs
and fluids need to be chosen carefully (41), while oxygen
concentrators use less space than oxygen cylinders (37).
The storage and distribution chain needs to ensure
medical material is kept within specified temperatures
(42), and provides security of controlled substances (37).
Teams need to take care if narcotics are imported and
used in a crisis (43). Guides are available including WHO
emergency health kits for primary health care workers
designed to assist a population of 10,000 for 3 months,
and fit on the back of a pick-up truck (29,44).
Equipment selection also needs to consider the work-
ing environment and the effects of noise, vibration,
altitude, decompression and exposure to the elements.
Power supply and battery life need to be considered (41).
Specific items of equipment include point-of-care testing
(POCT) and ultrasound, as access to diagnostic facilities
may help decrease the numbers transferred to remaining
hospital facilities (45). POCT should be considered by
international assistance teams (41), and has proven useful
Table 2. Levels of agreement of statements concerning logistic issues
Statement
1
Strongly
disagree
2
Disagree
3
Neither
disagree or agree
4
Agree
5
Strongly
agree
Not applicable/
missing
There needs to be dedicated logistic support 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 12 (20%) 47 (80%) 0 (0%)
Teams should be self sufficient for a
minimum of 72 hours
1 (2%) 0 (0%) 3 (5%) 11 (19%) 44 (75%) 0 (0%)
Transport to the site was not a problem 6 (10%) 14 (24%) 8 (14%) 22 (37%) 9 (15%) 0 (0%)
Transport around the disaster site/s was not a
problem
0 (0%) 14 (24%) 10 (17%) 25 (42%) 10 (17%) 0 (0%)
Pre deployment information was accurate 6 (10%) 19 (32%) 12 (20%) 17 (29%) 5 (8%) 0 (0%)
Communication with local health providers was
adequate.
1 (2%) 11 (19%) 12 (20%) 26 (44%) 5 (8%) 4 (7%)
Communication with NGO’s and agencies
(e.g. EMA, AusAID) was adequate.
1 (2%) 9 (15%) 20 (34%) 26 (44%) 2 (3%) 1 (2%)
Documentation methods were easy to use and
reliable
6 (10%) 27 (46%) 7 (12%) 15 (25%) 2 (3%) 2 (3%)
All team members should have the ability to use
communications equipment.
0 (0%) 4 (7%) 0 (0%) 24 (41%) 31 (53%) 0 (0%)
All team members should have the ability to
erect tents and shelters.
0 (0%) 4 (7%) 2 (3%) 26 (44%) 27 (46%) 0 (0%)
All team members should have the ability to use
water purification equipment.
0 (0%) 3 (5%) 5 (8%) 26 (44%) 25 (42%) 0 (0%)
Packaging of equipment enabled materials to
be found easily
9 (15%) 15 (25%) 11 (19%) 19 (32%) 3 (5%) 1 (2%)
Equipment could be moved easily between
areas by team members
4 (7%) 13 (22%) 12 (20%) 24 (41%) 4 (7%) 1 (2%)
Peter Aitken et al.
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Katrina response (46).
Transportation can severely restrict operations and has
been noted previously as a major problem after the
tsunami (19,47,48). In this study transport to the site was
seen as more problematic than transport around the site
itself.Airtransportsupportiscritical(49)butalltransport
options may be effected depending on the disaster and
local conditions, with an important logistics function
being the ability to secure means of transport (50).
Military affiliations may improve transport access with
transportation able to be arranged by government (33).
To avoid delays, pre-event simplification of bureau-
cracy is essential. The UN has attempted to ensure
simplified customs procedures including waiving of
economic restrictions, duties and taxes, expeditious
processing without examination, and simplified inspec-
tion procedures (51). Equipment manifests should be
prepared in advance to help smooth international cus-
toms procedures (39). Failure to do this may lead to
significant delays (44). Manifests also prevent material
being omitted. Lack of a prior designated disaster cache
may mean teams are unable to perform procedures due to
a lack of equipment or power (52). Lists and pre-packing
also makes operational set-up faster and easier and aids
equipment access if packaged according to functional
areas (36,53). Only 37% of the respondents felt packaging
enabled materials to be found easily.
Given the need for large volumes of supplies and low
likelihood of use, there are cost considerations with pre
packaging. A loan arrangement with a supplier, with
return of unused supplies, is convenient and economical
(54). This may involve maintenance of storage and
requisition lists within a Health authority and ability to
activate the mobilisation of equipment and drugs. This
ensures equipment and drugs are part of district supplies,
and are constantly turned over reducing wastage (55).
Other options are separate supply maintenance for a
more rapid response, but drugs and supplies rotated every
six months by external agencies (56). The provider must
also expect that not all equipment will be returned post
response (8). Stock rotation is not just important from a
cost perspective, but also for functionality. Plastic and
rubber materials may deteriorate, stock expire or changes
in safety standards, such as needle-less intravenous lines
(50), necessitating stockpile update. There are drawbacks
with reliance on external partner organisations, and while
private public partnerships are proposed as a means of
improved community resilience (57), often logical and
functional collaborations seem to fail when they are
needed most (58).
Having equipment pre-packed in cases able to be
carried by hand allows aircraft to be unloaded without
machinery, and teams to move in and out of the disaster
zone in small vehicles (37). Less than half the respondents
felt equipment could be moved easily between areas by
team members. The maximum safe weight was felt to be
20 to 40 kg, consistent with the US DMAT where each
member is responsible for their own gear with weight
limitations of 30 kg for warm weather and 40 kg for cold
weather (22). While these weights are related to personal
equipment, this still reflects safe maximum carriage
weights for an individual. Unless logistics support can
guarantee movement of equipment by machinery, all
equipment, whether personal or team based, should be
easily transportable by hand. Heavier items should be
configured so they can be carried manually and clearly
marked as ‘two-man’ or ‘four-man’ lift with handles for
ease, and safety, of movement.
Communication and information management is one
of the most consistent challenges in disaster response
(23,28,59 61). Valid information is critical to enable
decision-making and resource prioritisation (62) and
the quality of disaster management may depend on the
quality of communication and information (63). Both
technical and organisational aspects of communication
are important considerations in coordinating the health
response (64).
Team members need to be able to reliably communicate
with coordination centres locally and at home, and with
other team members (31). Normal communication net-
works may not be functional (62) and there needs to be
both alternatives and redundancy. Mobile phones have
been used (52,65) but a communication vacuum may
emerge once batteries fail (52). This is not restricted to
international response*access to batteries and rechar-
ging may also be problematic with domestic deployment
(50). Options include radios with the ability to change
frequencies or operate underground, satellite phones,
laptop computers and fax machines (31), while satellite
communications has been used for telehealth in India and
disaster management in large remote areas (66,67). The
further development of wireless technology and peer
networks may offer increasing solutions (59,60). There
are security challenges with use of any technology (59),
including media listening to mobile phone conversations
on non-secure networks (23).
To achieve broad based, proficient handling of com-
munications technology, it must be appropriate, easy to
use, meaningful to the user, and capable of overcoming
language and cultural barriers (61,67). While dedicated
communications support is essential, and a common
team element (20,21), all team members need to be
trained in use of communications equipment (40). Com-
munications support also needs to consider documenta-
tion. While few respondents in this survey felt that
documentation methods were easy to use and reliable,
this is not an uncommon problem. Medical records can
be difficult to maintain at disaster sites. Solutions include
Logistical support provided to Australian DMATs
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understand these (68).
It is important to avoid arriving with too many assets
without a clear strategy on how they will be used
(logistical push method) (69). Needs assessments should
help determine equipment needs, with accurate pre-
deployment information essential for this to be effective.
Modeling approaches may also help. A basic key can be
calculated and presetting done with final fit-out based on
information from a forward team (70). Analysis of past
experiences to determine patient characteristics, medica-
tions dispensed and investigations used may help in
predicting casemix, medicines and supplies needed for
subsequent similar deployments (71).
Logistics is arguably most developed in business supply
chains and the military. There is an opportunity to learn
from general supply chain mechanisms to enhance the
coordination capacity of disaster supply chains (72 74).
There are differences however. The primary objective of
commercial supply chains is to minimise costs associated
with business operations, while humanitarian logistics
seeks to minimise the suffering of the affected population
with cost a secondary consideration (74). Disaster
logistics also has to accept that it will be unable to satisfy
all needs and that aid needs to consider the human
suffering associated with lack of access to a given good or
service (deprivation costs), while commercial logistics
does not usually experience the same level of resource
scarcity or consequences of delivery failure (74).
Disaster logistics also faces significant challenges.
There may be damage to infrastructure and communica-
tion systems, large volumes of critical supplies to be
transported in a short timeframe if loss of life and
property is to be prevented and a huge amount of
uncertainty about what is actually needed, where it is
needed, and what is available at the site (74). Sheu
similarly classifies the challenges of emergency manage-
ment logistics into four distinct areas:
1) Defining emergency logistics with note that the
destination point in emergency logistics is near
affected areas where people are living under emer-
gency conditions;
2) An inability to control the timeliness of relief supply
distribution, especially in the critical three-day
period following a disaster;
3) Challenges in providing resource management for
emergency logistics during periods of operational
uncertainty and communications difficulties;
4) The demand for nearly inaccessible, yet crucial, real-
time relief data (75).
The military have long recognised the importance of
dedicated logistics support. This has been acknowledged
as a key element of a successful disaster response (76),
with the military approach possibly more suited to
deployable team logistic support than commercial supply
chain logistics. NATO defines logistics as ‘the science of
planning and carrying out the movement and mainte-
nance of forces’ (77). This includes material, personnel,
facilities, services and medical and health service support
(77). Of note, similar to deployable medical teams, rapid
military deployments out of area require deployable
logistic support units within combat formations, assured
access to strategic lift and deployable logistic assets (77).
The US Army have published a series of documents
dating back to 1996, which have provided an action plan
for logistics development. The tenets needed to achieve
focused logistics are described as: a seamless logistics
system, distribution-based logistics, total asset visibility,
agile infrastructure, rapid force projection, and an
adequate logistics footprint (78).
Tomasini and Wassenhove have recently proposed a
humanitarian logistics model that, has some similarities
to both NATO and the US Army tenets (79). This
includes the flow of materials, information, finance,
people and knowledge and skills in a system that needs
to be agile, adaptable and aligned, consistent with Lee’s
Triple-A model of supply chains (79).
A number of overarching frameworks and mathema-
tical models for humanitarian logistics exist, however, few
of these are for deployed teams, instead focussing on
distribution logistics (73) or vehicle routing in country
(80). One example is a dynamic relief-demand manage-
ment model for emergency logistics operations under
imperfect information conditions in large-scale natural
disasters (81). This consists of:
1) Data fusion to forecast relief demand in multiple
areas;
2) Fuzzy clustering to classify affected area into groups;
3) Multi-criteria decision making to rank the order of
priority of groups. While complex and more suited
to large-scale operations, tests accounting for differ-
ent experimental scenarios indicate that the overall
forecast errors are lower than 10% (81).
It is important to recognise from this, that logistic
support for deployable teams needs to integrate with the
larger relief effort. This integrated approach is an
essential component of the Cluster System. The Logistics
Cluster service offers Inter-Agency Logistics Response
Teams (LRT) and Inter-agency Transport and Logistics
Services which includes set up of staging areas, strategic
and tactical cargo movement by air and sea, mobile
storage, ground transport capacity, infrastructure repair,
office and accommodation facilities, and the necessary
coordination and information management (82).
A number of international organisations also offer
logistic support. The IFRC offers a Global Logistics
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Red Cross Red Crescent network but to share resources
with other humanitarian organisations (25). Of note, the
IFRC uses a decentralised disaster supply chain ap-
proach, which is felt to work much better than a
centralised approach (83). OCHA has made available a
‘Disaster Response Preparedness Toolkit’, which includes
resources, direct services and links (26).
Despite the availability of these resources and increas-
ing recognition of the importance of logistics, a number
of barriers need to be considered. These have been
identified as the political-administrative factors that
make it hard to organise an effective response (84), and
the implications of organisational culture (85). Coordina-
tion has also been shown to be more effective when there
are pre-established networks with local personnel. This
mandates logistic preparedness where possible, or en-
abling ‘swift trust’ development (86).
This study represented an analysis of data collected on
a cross-sectional survey of Australian DMAT members.
This group may encounter different challenges to huma-
nitarian aid workers and other groups responding to
disasters. In addition, the limited response from some
states, particularly New South Wales and Victoria,
suggested coverage concerns. This is offset to some degree
by the overall response rate, levels of experience amongst
responders and the representative mix of disciplines.
Hence, although generalisation and extrapolation of this
data will therefore be limited, the data can be useful in
developing more effective logistic support for deployment.
Conclusions
This study of Australian DMAT members reinforces the
importance of logistic support for deployment of DMAT.
There was unanimous agreement with the need for
dedicated logistic support with strong support for teams
to be self sufficient for a minimum period of 72 hours.
There is a need for accurate pre deployment information
to guide resource prioritisation with clearly labelled pre
packaging to assist access on site. Container weights
should be restricted to 20 to 40 kg, which would assist
transport around the site. Transport to the site was seen
as problematic and although recognised as inherently
difficult pre-determined arrangements may help to some
degree. All team members should be trained in use of
basic equipment such as communications equipment,
tents and shelters and water purification systems.
Logistic support should be incorporated into team
structure before, during and post deployment. Deploy-
able teams should have a logistic framework that is
able to support the flow of all equipment and personnel
in a timely and effective manner, and which is flexible
enough to be able to adapt to an uncertain, and fluid,
environment.
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